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Singaporean First: Challenging the Concept of Transnational 
Malay Masculinity 
Lenore Lyons and Michele Ford 
Since Singapore's independence in 1965, the People's Action Party's (henceforth the PAP) 
management of ethnicity and potential ethnic conflict has depended on a strategy that 
emphasizes selected 'race' identities.1 Under a policy of multiracialism, all Singaporeans fall 
into one of four official race categories - Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others. This policy, 
known as 'CMIO multiracialism', goes much further than simply providing an environment in 
which cultural and religious practices are observed and upheld. It downplays diversity within 
racial categories and emphasizes shared cultural and linguistic heritages within racial groups. 
In the process, race becomes an important way of labelling the population and individuals are 
encouraged to think about themselves using these racial categories. CMIO multiracialism 
relies for its legitimacy upon the imagery of an ever-present threat to national stability from 
inter-ethnic conflict. It is thus promoted as a pragmatic solution to the realities of nation 
building. The policy was developed in a context of concern about the promotion of Malay 
privilege under the leadership of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), in the 
short-lived Federation of Malaysia of which Singapore was a part from 1963 to 1965. During 
this period, the PAP promoted the concept of a 'Malaysian Malaysia' in which all races were 
given equal rights, against a 'Malay Malaysia' in which Malays (as bumiputera, literally 'sons 
of the soil') would be privileged above other ethnic groups (Lian and Rajah 2002). In contrast 
to UMNO's policies, the PAP sought to 'correct the imbalance in economic and social 
development' between the Malay and non-Malay communities through a focus on education 
(Lee Kuan Yew, cited in Bedlington 1981: 248-9). This view of racial equality continued 
after Singapore was ousted from the Federation and formed the basis of the idea of a 
'Singaporean Singapore'. 
However, in reality, not all races are equally valued for their contribution to the Singaporean 
national identity. The rhetoric of a 'Singaporean Singapore' contains an implicit, frequently 
aggressive, program of assimilation of racial minorities into a Chinese-dominated society. 
Singapore's economic success in the post-independence period is routinely attributed to 
aspects of Chinese culture, often presented under the rubric of 'Asian values', such as thrift, 
hard work, and a desire for education. Members of minority races are expected to maintain a 
sense of racial/cultural separateness, as expressed through markers such as diet, dress, 
religion and language, while jettisoning those aspects of culture that do not meet the desired 
attributes of the national identity (Barr and Low 2005: 167). Within this framework, Malays 
are encouraged to assimilate into Singaporean society in public, while reserving their Malay, 
and especially Muslim, identities for the private sphere.2 Significantly, the state's rendering of 
a homogenous Malay racial category serves not only to set them apart from the Chinese 
majority population, and by implication, a Chinese-determined national identity, but also to 
identify their cultural inferiority. In contrast to the Chinese, Malays are said to lack the key 
cultural attributes that would enable them to succeed in the modem global economy (Rahim 
1998). This cultural deficit is used to explain the Malay community's continuing economic 
and social disadvantage when compared to other racial groups (see Kamaludeen 2007; Li 
1989; Rahim 1998). 
When stereotypes about Malay cultural inferiority are combined with widespread concerns 
about the existence of a Pan-Malay (read Muslim) brotherhood, the Malay community's 
loyalty to the Singapore nation may sometimes be questioned. Former Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew articulated these sentiments in 1987 when he referred to concerns about 
Malay/Muslim loyalty: 'Are we sure that in a moment of crisis, when the heat is on, we are all 
together, heart to heart?' (Siddique 1989: 570). These concerns imply the innate perception 
amongst prominent politicians that there exists a trans-national cultural/religious identity 
shared by Singaporean Malays, Malaysian Malays and Indonesians that overshadows a sense 
of Singaporean nationalism - sentiments summed up by then Second Minister of Defence 
(and current Prime Minister) Lee Hsien Loong during a constituency tour in 1987: 
If there is a conflict, we don't want to put any of our soldiers in a difficult position 
where his emotions for the nation may be in conflict with his emotions for his 
religion ... We don't want to put anybody in that position where he feels he is not 
fighting a just cause, and perhaps worse, maybe his side is not the right side (The 
Straits Times 1987).3 
Fears concerning Singaporean Malays' divided loyalties have become even more apparent in 
the post-9/11 environment. During the 198os, the state, Malay civil society groups, and 
Muslim organizations actively promoted Islam as a means to counter a range of social 
problems facing the Malay community. In the post-9/11 period, however, the value of Islam 
as a form of 'cultural ballast' has come under intense scrutiny. Instead, it has been positioned 
as a potential threat to nationalism. In January 2003, the government issued a White Paper, 
'The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism' that included an examination of a 
'home-grown' terrorist threat. In both parliamentary and public debates about the White 
Paper, the broader issue of threats posed by international terrorism to Singapore has been 
sidelined by a focus on race relations and a concern that Southeast Asian Muslims in general, 
and Singaporean Malays in particular, are susceptible to a radical view of Islam terrorism that 
places religion above national loyalty (Ismail and Shaw 2006; Kadir 2006). This focus on 
Islam as a marker of potential disloyalty points to the ongoing conflation of racial and 
religious identities, as evident in the collective term 'Malay-Muslim' commonly used as a 
racial category by the government, community leaders and the press. 
This chapter calls into question ideas about the existence of a transnational Malay-Muslim 
identity by examining the ways in which Malay men understand and perform their 
masculinity vis-a-vis men in the neighbouring countries of Malaysia and Indonesia. It starts 
from the premise that issues of ethnic (and religious) 'loyalty' are questions that rest on 
primordial notions of 'self and 'other' attributed to ethnicity and religion. We argue that, in the 
context of Singapore, concepts of ethnic and national identity are shaped by two significant 
forces: the presence of the Chinese majority population, and the PAP's stance on Singapore's 
location in a Malay/Muslim archipelago (Brown 1994; Hill and Lian 1995). The Chinese 
majority population and the Chinese dominated parliament and bureaucracy play a critical 
role in shaping Malay identity not through a process of hybridisation that arises through 
direct contact and interaction, but through a state-led policy of comparison that requires the 
Malay community to constantly position itself in relation to the majority (Li 1989: 136). At 
the same time, given the heterogeneity of the Malay community (a fact eluded to in public 
statements about 'Malay loyalty'), any investigation into the meaning of a shared Malay 
identity also needs to consider to what extent 'Malayness' is constituted as 'a Singaporean 
experience, and to what extent this experience has itself been conditioned by geographical 
proximity to Malaysia and cultural affinities with other related communities in Malaysia, the 
Riau archipelago, and Indonesia' (Lian and Rajah 2002: 232).4 By examining how 
Singaporean Malay men negotiate and construct their identities, this paper both problematises 
the notion of a homogenous Malay identity in Singapore and seeks to subvert commonly held 
understandings about the presence of a transnational Malay masculinity in the region.5 
In the first part of this study, we explore these men's accounts of Malay marginalisation and 
issues of racial discrimination. The second part of the study will discuss cross-border travel 
and the construction of masculinities across borders. We argue that the ways in which young 
professional Malay men understand and respond to racial discrimination reflects their 
internalisation of a set of state-sponsored values commonly ascribed to the Chinese 
community, but which are also increasingly defined as essential elements of Singapore's 
national identity. These values come into sharper focus in the way that these men talk about 
their experiences of travel to Indonesia and Malaysia. In their accounts of 'Malaysian-Malay 
backwardness' and 'Indonesian corruption', the men assert their own national superiority as 
Singaporeans, and downplay any sense of shared ethnic identity. In a global context where 
Muslim masculinity has been positioned as inherently threatening, and in a local context 
where Malay (Muslim) masculinity is always already problematic, our analysis contributes to 
a more nuanced understanding of the ways class and ethnicity intersect in shaping 
Singaporean Malay men's sense of identity. 
Our discussion draws on data collected in interviews with Singaporean Malay men in the 
middle- and lower-income brackets over a four-year period to 2008. The interviews were 
conducted as part of a larger study on the construction of national and ethnic identity in the 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle.6 For the purposes of this paper we 
concentrate primarily on our interviews with professional men aged between 25 and 34. It is 
important to note that the ways in which these Malay men talk about their identities is 
coloured by the lens of class. These men are experiencing rapid social mobility in Singapore 
and the majority espouse a distinctly 'middle-income' outlook in terms of their aspirations and 
perceptions of their social and economic opportunities. At the same time, it is not possible to 
describe their class position solely as 'middle-income', since this label obscures the complex 
nature of inter-generational differences in education and income levels within Singaporean 
households. Their parents are employed in the service and manufacturing sectors, but these 
men have benefited from higher levels of education (including access to university) and 
subsequently higher wages. However, like most unmarried Singaporeans, they continue to 
live with their parents and siblings until they are married. Household income and residential 
structure are thus poor measures of their class location. Although these men represent less 
than 8 per cent of the Malay population of Singapore (Leow 2001), their status as potential 
community leaders makes them a significant group in the eyes of the state. By focusing on 
middle-income professional men, we can also explore the nexus between class and ethnicity 
in the construction of Malay masculinities. 
Understanding Malay marginality 
Malay marginality is a constant trope in the narratives that the Malay men in this study 
construct about what it means to 'be a man' in contemporary Singapore. These narratives 
draw on state-sponsored research that highlights the Malay community's disadvantage when 
compared to other racial groups. This relative disadvantage is measured in economic and 
social terms. Chinese households consistently out-perform Malay households in relation to 
household income and the margin has continued to grow. In 1980, the average Malay 
household income was 73 per cent of the Chinese household income, but by 2000, had 
dropped to only 60 per cent of the Chinese household income (Lee 2004: 32). Importantly, 
these figures do not take into consideration significant class differences within the Chinese 
community and the presence of significant numbers of Chinese households on low incomes. 
Thus the focus on 'Malay marginality' serves to obscure class divisions within Singapore, and 
forefronts race as a causal factor in economic and social disadvantage. Attention is primarily 
placed on Malays as a homogenous racial category in opposition to an undifferentiated, 
homogeneous 'Chinese' community. 
This form of analysis is supported by data that highlights broad racial differences in socio-
economic performance. According to the 2000 Census, over 30 per cent of working Malays 
were found in the manufacturing sector and were over-represented in manufacturing, 
transportation, business and social services industries compared with Indians and Chinese 
(Lee 2004: 33). By contrast, the Chinese dominate in professional, managerial and technical 
occupations. Educational differences play an important role in creating these occupational 
disparities between the Chinese and other ethnic groups (Rahim 1998)7 In comparison with 
the Chinese and Indian populations, Malays also experience higher divorce rates, larger 
numbers of single parents, larger family sizes, and are over-represented in drug offences, 
truancy, and un-wed teenage pregnancies (Mutalib 2005). These 'social problems' attract 
considerable government and public attention and serve to reinforce a series of negative 
stereotypes about the Malay community. In an attempt to redress these problems, the 
government supports a number of 'social uplifting' initiatives. Many of these programs are 
run through the Malay/Muslim community self-help organizations that provide education and 
training support for Malay children and lower-income workers, as well as life-skills and 
marriage preparation workshops. 
The PAP has always been careful to assert that Malays occupy a special status within 
Singapore as the indigenous people of the island nation. This special status is officially 
recognized in Article 89 of the Singapore Constitution: 
The government shall exercise its functions in such a manner as to recognize the 
special position of the Malays, who are indigenous people of Singapore, and 
accordingly it shall be the responsibility of the government to protect, safeguard, 
support, foster and promote their political, economic, social and cultural identity 
and the Malay language (cited in Mutalib 2005: 57-8). 
Among the 'privileges' granted to Malays was the recognition of Malay as the 'national' 
language (with Mandarin, Tamil and English identified as the other three 'official' languages); 
free education from primary school to university; the provision of a mosque in every HDB 
estate; and the appointment of Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs in the Cabinet. These 
constitutional provisions are mainly symbolic. In practical terms, the symbolism of Malays' 
special status means little in the face of the Malay community's marginality vis-a-vis other 
groups, particularly since Singapore Malays no longer enjoy the special quotas and other 
forms of governmental support originally identified at the time of Independence (Mutalib 
2005: 70). For example, Malay and Muslim families contribute to Mendaki programs that 
support a range of activities, including the payment of tertiary educational fees. 
Consequently, while tertiary education remains symbolically free for the community as a 
whole, it is not automatically a right for individual students and their families. 
The PAP government recognizes that the Malay community still lags behind other ethnic 
groups on a range of key socio-economic indicators, but asserts that a state-sponsored policy 
of meritocracy ensures that anyone can succeed based on merit and not racial background 
(Mutalib 2005).8 While these claims are certainly supported by countless examples of 
working class individuals who 'work hard' and succeed, such statements overlook the extent 
to which hard work is frequently culturally inscribed. Writing in the 1980s, Tania Li (1989: 
167) observed that: 
the image of Malays as perennially backward, or reified cultural explanations for 
Malay backwardness, cannot be dismissed as merely false. The image of 
backwardness and its supposed cultural causes have themselves become part of 
the cultural fabric of Malay and Singapore society, and they have real practical 
effects as they are incorporated into the daily lives of ordinary Singaporeans and 
into national political processes. 
Although Tania Murray Li's study is now several decades old, it provides one of the few 
detailed ethnographic accounts of the Malay community. Her comments are thus important 
for historicising the formation of 'marginality' as both a policy imperative and a socially 
inscribed trait. Lily Rahim's (1998) study of Malay marginality, published a decade after Li's 
book, is also insightful in its demonstration of the way that the discourse of backwardness has 
been taken up at the policy level. These and other studies show that Malay marginalization is 
attributed by both the state and community members themselves to entrenched cultural values 
which hold Malays back from taking advantage of the education and employment 
opportunities provided under PAP rule. Malay men are said to lack intellectual capacity and 
motivation, and to be better with their hands (physical and technical skills) and less capable 
in academic areas (Rahim 1998). This is combined with a cultural propensity to be 'laid back' 
and not interested in hard work, which echoes the 'lazy native' thesis proposed by colonial 
authorities, who described Malay men as effeminate and unsuited to waged labour (Crinis 
2004).9 
These stereotypes reflect a widely held view in the non-Malay community that Malay men 
lack the key cultural and biological attributes that would enable them to succeed in the 
modern Singaporean economy (Li 1998). In his study of youth in the army, Leong Choon 
Cheong notes that Chinese national servicemen describe Malay men as 'lazy, unintelligent, 
unhygienic, and aggressive' (cited in Rahim 1998: 57-8), while laziness and drug taking also 
emerge as common stereotypes of Malay male youth in contemporary studies of popular 
culture (see Liew and Fu 2006). There has been little scholarly attention, however, to the 
continued salience of these stereotypes and the complexities surrounding 'Malay identity' 
over the last three decades, particularly in the context of growing class diversity amongst 
Malays. There has also been little examination of the implicit gendering of these accounts. 
Common racial stereotypes of 'Malays' rarely make gender distinctions, with the exception of 
accounts regarding teenage pregnancies that focus on the promiscuous behaviour of Malay 
girls. For this reason, our study sought to examine the ways in which young professional men 
themselves understand the continued relevance of the common stereotypes that circulate 
about Malay men. 
When asked how they thought Malay men were perceived by the non-Malay Singaporean 
community, the men we interviewed responded with terms and phrases like 'slacker', 
'relaxed', 'sitting in void decks', 'soccer players', 'doing technical work', 'artists', or 'not 
professionals'. Another man, Abdullah, a 28 year-old entrepreneur, described the traits 
commonly ascribed to Malays as pre-colonial: 
The Malays are easily content, laidback. We managed to survive the British 
invasion in that way. Can you imagine what would have happened if the 
Temenggong had not sold our island? Got some money, happy already! 
For the men we interviewed, the marginality of Malay masculinity is reinforced in these 
stereotypes. Acutely aware of how their own life choices and experiences are shaped by 
expectations of Malay cultural inferiority, these men actively construct their own 
masculinities in contradistinction to these images. 
The ‘level’ playing field 
Ambitious young Malay men's decisions not to act out the 'typical Malay' trope are 
complicated by state and community structures that reinforce Malays' subordinate 
positionality. The claim that Singapore operates on a 'level playing field' (i.e., meritocracy) 
obscures the myriad ways in which Singaporeans from all racial groups are encouraged to 
assimilate into PAP-promoted values. The education system is an important site for this 
process of 'social engineering'. For example, Barr and Low's (2005) study of kindergartens 
demonstrates the ways in which education policy and the policy of educational 'streaming' tie 
future success to academic learning. These practices impact negatively on many children in 
low-income households of all racial groups, who often lack positive role models in school 
and find it difficult to study and receive support in their home environments. Rahim (1998) 
argues that active discrimination and stereotyping also occurs in schools - Malay children are 
streamed into technical areas and rarely encouraged to pursue academic subjects. When 
educational streaming is combined with racial stereotyping, it can have a profound impact on 
future education and employment opportunities. 
These processes are further reinforced by the strong segregation that occurs within schools, in 
which children (and teachers) tend to mix with members of their own ethnic group (see Lee et 
al. 2004; Li 1989; Rahim 1998). For Malay children this is enhanced by a strong cultural 
imperative not to be a 'loner'. This pressure is exemplified in the following conversation 
amongst three young professional Malay men in their late 20s. The three men met during 
secondary school. 
Zainul: I didn’t play soccer until secondary school. When I see Malay guys playing 
soccer […] I have this perception that these are the real Malay guys […] 
because they play soccer, they speak Malay. [As a consequence] I feel pressure 
to play soccer. 
 
Musa: You feel isolated. 
 
Zainul: Pressure to play. So I started to learn, but after a while you grow up and feel 
more confident to try other things. But at elementary and high school soccer is 
more central. 
 
Interviewer: Pressure from other Malay boys? 
 
Zainul: They feel that you must or otherwise you are not [a real Malay]. 
 
Iqbal: We pressure ourselves. Not to be seen as an isolated individual. 
 
 
For Zainul, a 26 year-old civil servant, playing soccer became a means of being accepted 
within his Malay peer group. In the process, he became 'a real Malay guy' who spoke Malay 
and could perform a culturally acceptable form of Malay masculinity. The transcript 
presented above does not portray the reactions of Iqbal (a 26-year-old civil servant) and Musa 
(a 27-year-old teacher) to Zainul's opening statement. When Zainul said 'I didn't play soccer 
until secondary school', Musa immediately responded by shouting out: 'But good!' [meaning: 
He played well] followed by laughter from Iqbal and Musa and a wry smile from Zainul as he 
continued to speak. When he said 'I feel pressured to play soccer' there was further laughter. 
The laughter and jibe about Zainul's soccer skills served to reinforce the centrality of the 
soccer identity for all the men. Soccer is a means of establishing group identity for Malay 
men despite their recognition that peer pressure to be a 'real Malay guy' by playing soccer 
served to re-inscribe racial stereotyping.10 
Positive racism 
Although the men we spoke to were able to provide detailed descriptions of the stereotypes 
that circulate about Malay men, they were uncomfortable describing these as instances of 
racism or prejudice. Where a stereotype is linked to a positive portrayal of skill (as in the 
example of soccer or Malays being good singers), it is difficult to identify those stereotypes 
as discriminatory. Jamal, a 27 year-old therapist, related how in secondary school non-
Malays always assumed he would be good at soccer: 'Even if they haven't seen you play, they 
automatically think you are going to be good and call you up to play on their team'. As the 
men asserted, 'We really are good soccer players.' 
Racist notions of minority men's masculine physicality are common in other cultural and 
national settings (cf. Majors 1998; Messner 1989). The men were cognisant of the parallels 
between their situation and that of minority men in other countries, as demonstrated in the 
following exchange that preceded the discussion of soccer playing outlined above: 
Zainul: At university, they know I am Malay, they want me to play soccer. 
 
Musa: They perceive us to be better at technical aspects, soccer, sports, that kind of 
thing. I think in terms of education they don’t know us, because the numbers of 
us in university are so small. 
 
Iqbal: Similar with African Americans and all. 
 
Positive portrayals of minority men's 'innate' physical attributes and sporting prowess act as a 
source of community pride, and also serve to channel boys and young men into naturalized 
roles in commodified sports cultures that in turn reinforce 'positive' racism (Hokowhitu 2004: 
262). In a similar way, for the young men in our study, the dominance of Malay players in the 
national soccer league is both a reminder of ethnic stereotyping and a source of ethnic pride. 
Another common image that the men found difficult to critique is the emphasis on the 
Malays' suitability as entertainers given their 'innate' artistic abilities. Musa asserted: 'We are 
considered to be good artists because two Singapore Idols are Malays.' Similarly, the men 
could see little harm in the comic role commonly played by Malay men in English and 
Chinese sit-coms. Zainul stated: 'I think the Malay man in the mass media is portrayed not as 
a negative. They may portray [him] as a buffoon but not negative. In a comedy setting it is 
very funny.' Stereotypes in film and television serve as a convenient form of shorthand to 
convey information about characters. In the case of comedy, such stereotypes help to 
establish instantly recognizable character types (King 2002). Exaggerated portrayals of racial 
traits can be a form of parody, and thus a strategy of subversion of racial norms. 
Distinguishing between satire and the reproduction of racism is fraught. Scholars of race have 
argued that trying to differentiate between racism and 'harmless' racial jokes obscures the 
normalising function of racial stereotypes. For example, writing about the United States, Park 
et al. (2006) assert that although comedies starring racial minorities facilitate racial tolerance, 
including the acceptance of Asian men, they rely on an explicit, and often normalized, 
representation of racial hierarchy. One of the consequences of this is the naturalization of 
racial stereotypes. The association of Malays with technical, sporting or artistic skills and 
Chinese with entrepreneurial ability is reinforced in a local Chinese joke, which serves to 
entrench a widely held belief that the Chinese excel in business and other racial groups do 
not: 
Q: Why don't the Chinese play soccer?  
A: Because as soon as we get a corner, we open a shop. 
The men's discussion of stereotypes and their reluctance to identify these as instances of 
racism may reflect a widespread unwillingness by Singaporeans to discuss race issues 
publicly (Lai 1995). Openly voicing opinions about racial discrimination can lead to public 
(and criminal) charges of being a 'racial chauvinist'.11 At the same time, however, these views 
must also be read against the men's own understanding of the saliency of such stereotypes - 
as in this conversation with Salleh, a 27 year-old engineer: 
Salleh: I think sometimes you can’t blame them [non-Malays]. Like Malays take drugs 
and all. And I also feel that Malays are lazy. 
 
Interviewer: Why? 
 
Salleh: They are easily content with life. They have a short objective in life. To get a 
car. Even if they cannot afford also they must buy one car, must buy one big 
house, but their kids education they don’t care also. I have some stories from 
my friends lah. They can’t afford their kids poly[technic] education or 
university education but they can afford one big car and everything else lah. 
They like to show off. And they are full of debts. 
The men contrasted their own achievements, including their tertiary education and 
professional employment, with those of the 'typical Malay'. Although they were familiar with 
the common stereotypes used to describe Malays, they either excluded themselves from these 
descriptions or admitted to limited, and less problematic, 'slippages'. A common example was 
the men's descriptions of their own study habits in contrast to those of their Chinese 
classmates. A number of the men admitted that unlike their Chinese peers, they did not study 
as hard, but rather were satisfied with achieving a pass grade in their tertiary studies. They 
described this character fault - laziness - as a product of their Malayness and simultaneously 
painted an unproblematic portrait of all their Chinese classmates as hardworking, high 
achievers. Although the men did not measure up to an idealized vision of hegemonic Chinese 
masculinity, they nonetheless aspired to it and strived to achieve what they described as a 
'normal' way of 'being a man'. When asked to talk about Chinese masculinity, Zulfikar, a 30 
year-old flight attendant, responded: 'I guess Chinese guys are like normal. Stereotypical ... 
what we expect of normal society.' 
The men in our study are caught in a double bind - they want to challenge the veracity of the 
many negative stereotypes used to label the Malay community, and particularly Malay men, 
but they also rely on those same stereotypes to secure their own 'exceptional' status in relation 
to education and employment opportunities, as well as achievements, within the Malay 
community. When they fail to measure up to their own, and society's, definition of a 'normal 
man', they attribute their personal failings to an inherited cultural inferiority. The men's entry 
into the middle class is thus always fragile and premised on their ability to internalize and 
demonstrate the 'superior' values of industry and thrift. Tania Li (1989) observed that 
amongst middle-income Malay parents these insecurities are manifested in the decision to 
move their families out of lower-income housing estates and to encourage their children to 
socialize with non-Malay friends. While the majority of men in our study were unmarried, 
they exhibited a similar desire to demarcate the boundaries between themselves and other 
Malays whom they described as members of the 'lower class'. 
Masculinity across borders 
During the discussions that were held with the interviewees about non-Singaporean Malay 
men, the internalization of the middle-income attributes of thrift and hard work by 
professional Singapore Malay men became even more apparent. In asserting a claim about 
the 'foreignness' of non-Singaporean Malays, the men drew on their direct experiences of 
travel to Indonesia and Malaysia. All of the interviewees had travelled to Malaysia for short 
holidays, and sometimes on business. Two-thirds of them had travelled to Indonesia, 
primarily Jakarta, for similar reasons. Their accounts of these 'other Malays' drew on their 
travel experiences as well as common Singaporean stereotypes of Malaysian Malays and 
Indonesians.12 The men were all sensitive to the national significance of the discourse of a 
'Singaporean Singapore', in opposition to a 'Malay Malaysia', and were familiar with the issue 
of loyalty that hung over the Malay community. However, they were adamant that the 
concept of a shared cross-border identity with other Malays made little sense. 
In their accounts of their trips abroad, shared culture, language and religion emerged as 
important factors in facilitating ease of travel. While many of the men described the 
enjoyment they obtained from eating Malaysian and Indonesian food when they travelled,13 
some also expressed relief that they did not have to worry about dietary restrictions. As Musa 
observed in relation to the presence halal14 food: The moment I reach Malaysia or Indonesia 
the first thing that hits my mind is that I can eat almost everything.' Musa's comment suggests 
that for Malay Muslims living in Singapore, restrictions associated with food taboos cannot 
be underestimated. A wide variety of halal food is available in Singapore, and most large 
businesses and schools which provide canteens also supply separate eating utensils for halal 
food stalls. When eating in unfamiliar places many Muslims may err on the side of caution by 
only ordering drinks or fruit. Many Singaporean Muslims also acknowledge that non-
Muslims are not always aware of the issues associated with food taboos, and do not appear to 
understand that many Muslims feel awkward if their Chinese friends and colleagues order 
pork dishes and eat them at the same table. Food taboos become less important when 
travelling abroad to a predominantly Muslim country, and consequently the men felt a sense 
of ease in relation to their dietary habits. 
For those men who had travelled to Indonesia or Malaysia as part of a racially mixed group 
of friends or colleagues, language was an important source of cultural capital in the groups' 
interactions with Indonesian or Malay service providers, including hotel and restaurant staff 
and taxi drivers. Their ability to communicate in Bahasa Melayu or Bahasa Indonesia 
immediately made them indispensable to their Chinese friends and colleagues. Their ethnicity 
was thus a positive rather than a negative attribute. They explained that in Singapore, Malay 
language abilities are not highly valued when compared to Mandarin. They argued that 
Chinese employers frequently discriminate against Malays in job advertisements by using the 
phrase 'Bilingual in English and Mandarin' as a required or desirable skill. When travelling to 
Malaysia and Indonesia, Malay men's ability to act as language brokers for non-Malay 
speaking Singaporeans not only improved their status within their peer group, but also 
inevitably allowed them to adopt the position of cultural broker in interactions between their 
peer group, and between themselves and Indonesians or Malaysian Malays. Language ability 
thus became an important source of power. 
At a personal level, shared language is a means to ease the stress that often accompanies 
travel. The majority of the men are effectively bilingual in English and Malay, and professed 
to feeling comfortable travelling anywhere these languages are spoken. Although their travels 
to Indonesia or Malaysia for work or leisure were not premised on language, it clearly 
facilitated the travel process. However, shared language is not an attribute that all of the men 
wanted to draw upon in their interactions with Malaysian Malays or Indonesians. For 
example, Zulfikar, an ambitious flight attendant with Singapore Airlines, chooses to distance 
himself by deliberately using English as a marker of his Singaporean nationality: 
I choose to let them know that I'm Singaporean because ... because I know we are 
much more superior than them ... I choose not to be mistaken as being like 
Malaysian or an Indonesian. Although I can do a Malaysian-Malay accent or an 
Indonesian accent. That kind of thing. But I choose strategically not to be 
assimilated. But ... if there's trouble or that kind of thing and I know that being 
local counts, I guess I can ... I have to do it. But otherwise, to show my superiority 
[I speak in English] I guess. 
Differences in purchasing power are another area for the demonstration of Singaporean 
Malay superiority. This sense of superiority is most clearly expressed in a comment by 
Iskandar, a 32 year-old journalist, who said: 'When realising that you are Singaporean, they 
like kowtow to you a bit and, okay, make a deal. We have better bargaining power 
nowadays.' The greater bargaining power experienced by Iskandar is a product of Singapore's 
rapid economic development, which has produced higher standards of living and significant 
income disparities between Singaporeans and their regional neighbours. 
The men stated that as a consequence of Singapore's economic development there has been a 
distinct divide between their lives and those of their regional neighbours. Despite the benefits 
that accrue from shared language and cultural and religious practices, all of the men felt alien 
when they travelled to Indonesia and Malaysia. In our conversations, the men frequently 
distanced themselves from the backwardness of Indonesian or Malaysian cultures by 
emphasising their Singaporean-ness. They claimed that although they shared language and 
religious and cultural traits with Indonesians and Malaysian Malays, they identified more 
closely with Chinese and Indian Singaporeans. According to Salleh, 
When in Malaysia, I feel proud to be a Singaporean because at least I can tell the 
Malaysian guys that I stand on the same page as the other races in my home 
country. Because I met some Malaysians who kept telling me that that Malays in 
Singapore don't know their rights. What they are saying is that Singapore belongs 
to the Malays [as indigenous peoples]. I think Singapore belongs to no one. It's a 
meritocracy. 
While the divide is most easily measured by English language ability and income 
differentials, it also manifests itself in the outlook and behaviour of Malaysian Malays and 
Indonesians. 
When I was there [Malaysia] I felt that we are better off. Better level of education. 
Can speak English. More worldly. . .. Because over there not many Malays are 
that well educated. And they don't really speak English. They work in the services 
sector ... And it doesn't help that some of them are really quite rude to you in a 
very bad way. Like a third world country mentality. 
The 'third world mentality' that Zainul refers to was brought up by many other interviewees 
who described the perceived differences between Singaporean efficiency and Indonesian or 
Malaysian backwardness, inefficiency and corruption. The poor standard of living and lack of 
economic development in both countries were compared unfavourably to conditions 
experienced in Singapore. According to Iskandar, 
I think the standard of living there is very low. Many of them would do anything 
just to get a dollar, they will just do anything, even cheat others. Even though I am 
a Muslim, he is a Muslim. I am from the same culture, they are from the same 
culture but they don't care about that. They would do anything just to get a dollar. 
For the young men in our study, travel to Indonesia or Malaysia did not represent a trip back 
to some form of authentic Malay culture and identity.15 This is in contrast to older Malay men 
and women informants who described in some detail the joy they obtained from experiencing 
'the real kampong lifestyle' and visiting places that were 'just like Singapore in the 1950s or 
6os'. Rather, it served to strengthen the young Malay men's awareness of their middle-income 
achievements. In this way, inefficiency, corruption and deception are not only markers of 
national difference between Singapore and its neighbours. These traits distinguish backward 
non-Singaporean Malays from modem Singaporean Malays. 
At the same time, the keen awareness that remnants of an inefficient Malay culture remain in 
Singapore, coupled with a culture that venerates the Chinese as hard working, results in a 
cultural hierarchy that positions other Malays below Singaporean Malays. According to 
Zulkifar,  
Malaysian Malays see us as being much more snobby - snobbish. And, ah ... yeah, 
more like among the upper class. But I guess I deem them as much more inferior 
because of how their living standards are and how they grew up lah. I guess in a 
way they don't really have to work hard - they don't have to put in effort to 
survive. And there's no competitiveness in them. So they're much more - they're 
even more laid-back than us lah! And they really have bad English. So, they're 
inferior to us .... The Chinese deem the Malay group to be Ma-lazy. So, I guess in 
a way we have to prove ourselves, that we can actually also do the job - even 
better than them. But of course, although the Singaporean Malays are deemed to 
be lazy, I guess you can really see that the Malaysian Malays are much lazier. 
According to the men, their own personal difference from those they consider to be more 
'Ma-lazy' stems from the opportunities that Singapore's advanced, meritocratic society has 
afforded them. As Mustafa, a 29 year-old IT worker, states: '[Singaporean] Malays tend to be 
go-getters, we live in an environment where you have to work, don't laze around. Over there 
they don't work unless they really have to.' Although Mustafa describes all Singaporean 
Malays as 'go-getters', he acknowledges that he is really only referring to middle-income, 
educated Malays such as himself, who have taken advantage of the opportunities provided in 
a multiracial, meritocratic society, and adopted a 'Singaporean' identity. 
Mary Louise Pratt's (1992) concept of the 'contact zone' provides a useful way of thinking 
about the nature of these Malay men's cross-border encounters. Pratt uses the term to 
emphasize 'how subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each other ... not in terms 
of separateness or apartheid, but in terms of co-presence, interaction, interlocking 
understandings and practices, often within radically asymmetrical relations of power' (Pratt 
1992: 7). As we have shown here, middle-income Singaporean Malay men's experiences with 
the other Malays of Malaysia and Indonesia in the contact zone serves to reinforce their 
Singaporean-ness, not their shared cultural and religious heritages. It enables them to recast 
their marginality within Singapore by emphasizing the cultural capital afforded to them by 
being modem Malay men. 
Conclusion 
Our analysis calls attention to the complex intersections between ethnicity, class and 
nationality in shaping constructions of masculinity. However, it is also apparent that there is 
the need to understand the ways masculinities are shaped by temporal and geo-spatial shifts. 
These issues are clearly demonstrated in the interviewees' descriptions of their lower-class 
Singaporean Malay compatriots, as well as in their accounts of their travels to Indonesia and 
Malaysia. The interviewees' discussions of what it means to be a Malay man in Singapore 
today are shaped by their complex reading of their own location within an ethnic community 
that is the subject of constant criticism and the object of racial discrimination. They have 
been brought up in an environment that valorises hard work as a Chinese attribute. In contrast 
to the positive accounts of the Chinese community's entrepreneurial spirit and thrift, Malays 
are reprimanded for their indolence and questioned about their loyalty to the nation. The 
young professional Malay men in our study have responded to these issues by internalising a 
set of state-sponsored values that they describe as essential elements of Singapore's national 
identity. At home, amongst the Chinese majority, they work hard to distance themselves from 
other Singaporean Malays whom they depict as lazy and backward in their outlook. 
These distancing strategies are also apparent in the men's accounts of their travel to Indonesia 
and Malaysia. They describe Malaysian Malays and Indonesians as backward, corrupt and 
inefficient and assert that these other Malays are even lazier than their lower-class 
Singaporean counterparts. When they travel abroad, the men's wealth, education and middle 
class outlook serve as easily identifiable markers of their superiority when compared to 
subordinate Indonesian and Malaysian men.16 More significantly, the men actively use these 
attributes to lay claim to a 'Singaporean-ness' that they share with other middle-income 
Singaporeans. Rather than providing a shared sense of ethnic Pan-Malay identity, travel 
serves to assert the men's difference from Malays in the region. Paradoxically, then, the sense 
of superiority that these men experience when travelling to Indonesia and Malaysia re-
inscribes their marginality in Singapore. Rather than making them feel racial discrimination 
more keenly, their experience of travel to majority-Malay countries reinforces their 
satisfaction with the status quo. This view was summed up by Iqbal, who asserts that 
'Although we are discriminated against ... we are all living happy lives here.' 
It is this statement, perhaps more than any others, that sums up the complex nature of these 
men's subordinate masculinity vis-a-vis Chinese Singaporean men. The men seek to 
minimize the damaging implications of racial discrimination by distancing themselves not 
only from lower-class Malays within their own ethnic community, but from the Malay 
citizens of less developed countries in the region. Crossing the border affords them the 
opportunity to imagine a space in which they are no longer a marginalized ethnic minority, 
but a successful example of Malay masculinity built on hard work and disciplined effort. At 
home, however, they know that as much as they try, they will always be tainted by the 
discourse of cultural inferiority. As Iqbal's comment suggests, young middle-income Malay 
men manage this dilemma by entering into a bargain with the state- they decide to be 
'Singaporean first', and in doing so accept cultural discrimination for the rewards of 
modernity. 
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Notes 
1 The term 'race' is used in Singapore to refer to official state ethnic categories. Its usage implies that ethnic 
groups are marked not only by cultural and linguistic difference, but also biological differences. For a discussion 
of the ways in which the term race is used in popular and state discourses in Singapore, see Lai (1995). We use 
the term 'race' throughout this article to reflect its common usage in Singapore. 
2 Malays are a significant ethnic minority in Singapore, representing 14% of the total population. The Chinese 
are the dominant ethnic group (75%), with a smaller minority of Indians (9%), and Others, including Eurasians 
and Europeans (Singapore Department of Statistics 2007). The state defines Malays as 'persons of Malay or 
Indonesian origin, such as Javanese, Boyanese, Bugis, etc.' (Singapore Department of Statistics 2007). 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 Lee Hsien Loong's comments were made at a time when bi-lateral relations with Malaysia were particularly 
tense, and further sparked ongoing allegations by the Malaysian government that the PAP actively discriminated 
against Malays (see Leifer 2000). 
4 For example, Lily Rahim (1999: 39) argues that the 'Malaysia card' has been 'periodically employed by the 
PAP leadership to maintain a collective psyche of insecurity among the predominantly Chinese populace who 
are acutely conscious of the island's resource limitations and geo-political locale in the heart of a Malay-Muslim 
region'. She notes that the 'Singapore card' has similarly been deployed on the Malaysian side of the causeway. 
5 In seeking to problematise the notion of a homogenous Malay identity we are not suggesting that 'the Chinese' 
are a monolithic group. CMIO multiracialism obscures heterogeneity within all so-called official races (Lai 
1995). 
6 The research on which this paper is based was funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery 
Project grant In the Shadow of Singapore: The Limits of Transnationalism in Insular Riau (DP0557368) - see 
project website http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/research/intheshadow/. We particularly want to thank Mohamed 
Fairoz bin Ahmad for his assistance in conducting some of the interviews. 
7 Differences in educational qualifications do not provide the only explanation for Malay marginalisation. The 
numerically superior Chinese erect a range of barriers to exclude Malays (and Indians) from higher paying 
occupations, including active discrimination in hiring practices and promotion practices, as well as more subtle 
barriers such as language requirements (Lee 2004). 
8 Barr and Low (2005, 161) argue that CMIO multiracialism enjoys a 'truly symbiotic relationship' with the 
other key pillar of PAP rule - meritocracy - a policy that emphasises the fairness of the Singapore system and 
explains the subordinate role of minority races. 
9 This view continued to be deployed by the new ruling elite in the early years of Independence. For example, 
Holden (2001: 420) argues that in former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's memoir, The Singapore Story (1999), 
Indian and Malay men are portrayed as 'effete, governed by emotion and appetite, and unable to apply the 
disciplinary practices necessary for the founding of a new nation'. 
10 It is also a source of ethnic pride. At the very end of this interview, they returned to the topic of soccer and 
concluded the discussion with the following comment - 'Mostly we are good soccer players'. We interpreted this 
statement as a means of concluding the interview with a positive statement about Malay masculinity. 
11 Although it was easy for the men to provide lists of common stereotypes about different racial groups, some 
of them were reluctant to discuss instances where they had personally experienced discrimination. Sometimes 
they would talk about events that had affected unnamed friends or family, or they would halt the direction of the 
conversation with claims that such matters were 'too sensitive' for further discussion. These concerns were also 
expressed in the men's choice of language. The majority of interviews were conducted in public places such as 
restaurants and coffee shops. In these settings, there were frequent opportunities for other patrons to eavesdrop 
or overhear comments. It was not uncommon in these settings for the men to lower their voices or code switch 
from English into Malay when discussing instances of racism, or when talking negatively about the behaviour of 
the Chinese majority population. 
12 We use the term 'other Malays' here in the way in which our respondents used it- to refer to Malays in 
Malaysia, and Indonesians. The term does not refer to an ethnic identity but a seemingly homogenous 
population characterised by language (Bahasa Melayu/Indonesia) and religion (Islam). 
13 Enjoyment of food in itself is a marker of one's authentic 'Singaporean-ness' (cf. Chua 2003). 
14 'Halal' is a word taken from Arabic that means lawful or permitted, and refers to any food or drink that is 
permitted for consumption under Islam. 
15 A number of our Chinese informants described their trips to Mainland China as an opportunity to 're-connect' 
with their Chinese culture and identity, often with mixed results. 
16 It is these men's middle class outlook that is perhaps the greatest marker of difference. Due to the greater 
purchasing power of the Singapore dollar in the region, many working-class Singaporean Malay men are able to 
experience a 'middle-income lifestyle' when they cross the border. However, these experiences of class mobility 
are usually only transitory. For a greater discussion of working-class Singaporean Malay masculinity, see our 
work on cross-border marriages and sex tourism in the Riau Islands (Lyons and Ford 2008). 
